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We analyze the extent and the direction of trade misinvoicing in the 
context of the new policy environment that has affected the Turkish 
economy in the post 1990 period. Utilizing bilateral partner country 
statistics between Turkey and its major trading partners, we observe 
persisting export overinvoicing and an oscillating pattern of import 
misinvoicing at the aggregate level. Country-specific data reveal 
different patterns. As opposed to the general trend in misinvoicing, 
exports to China are underinvoiced and imports are overinvoiced. We 
also analyze how the liberalization policies and the customs union 
agreement with the European Union countries affect trade misinvoicing. 
We find that, with trade liberalization policies, import misinvoicing has 
decreased at the aggregate level. However, contrary to the expectations, 
customs union agreement did not help decrease the extent of trade 
misinvoicing in Turkey. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Intuitively, when two countries trade with each other, the data reported 
by exporter country should mirror the data reported by the importer 
country after cif/fob adjustment. However, this is often not the case for 
several reasons. One explanation for the discrepancies in bilateral trade 
data is trade misinvoicing. Exporters can engage in export 
underinvoicing to bring less foreign exchange into the country than they 
actually earn or overinvoice export earnings in order to take advantage 
of export subsidies. Importers, on the other hand, have a tendency to 
overinvoice to gain access to greater foreign exchange than required and 
they can underinvoice to avoid tariffs. This practice was particularly 
common during the 1970s and 1980s because of the protectionist trade 
policies of that time. This resulted in a number of studies examining the 
effects of these policies on the discrepancies in foreign trade data 
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(Bhagwati,1964; Naya and Morgan, 1969; Morgenstern, 1963; Pitt, 
1984; McDonald, 1985).  
 
The issue of inaccuracies in the trade data remains in the trade literature 
to the present day. By analyzing trade data based on product categories, 
Yeats (1990) argues that trade data between African countries and their 
partners indicate large-scale smuggling activities. Fisman and Wei 
(2004) consider the case of China and conclude that underreporting of 
import values and mislabeling of higher taxed products as lower taxed 
are widespread practices. Beja (2008) estimates the amount of trade 
misinvoicing for China between 2000 and 2005 as US $1.4 trillion. 
Hsiah and Moretti (2006) show that the government of Iraq, under the 
“oil for food” program underinvoiced its oil exports. Berger and Nitsch 
(2008) examine the relation between the level of corruption and foreign 
trade data discrepancies for the world’s five largest importers between 
2002-2006 and conclude that the discrepancies increase with the level of 
corruption. Farzanegan (2009) examines smuggling in Iran using a 
structural equation approach in order to investigate the causes of illegal 
trade. Buehn and Eicler (2009) analyze the determinants of trade 
misinvoicing and find that black market premium and high tariff rates 
are the main factors causing illegal reporting. Patnaik et al. (2009) 
examine the link between trade misinvoicing and capital account 
liberalization and argue that opening of the capital account leads to a 
decline in trade misinvoicing.  
 
Misleading declarations of trade data have been noted as “very 
common” in trade activities in Turkey. Bhagwati (1964) provides an 
early assesment of such activities and argue that the discrepancies 
between the import data of Turkey and the export data of her partner 
countries were caused by import duties higher than the black market 
premium on foreign exchange. Celasun and Rodrik (1989) suggest that 
the reason of the increase in Turkish exports after 1980 was export 
overinvoicing to take advantage of export subsidies. Tokdemir and 
Gunluk-Senesen (1997) compare official records of Turkish export and 
import data with data of major OECD trade partners for the period 1970 
and 1991 and conclude that trade misinvoicing has not disappeared with 
the liberalization of the trade regime. 
In this study, our objective is to update and extend the earlier studies on 
this subject in view of the new policy environment that has affected the 
Turkish economy since the 1990s. One issue that needs to be adressed in 
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particular is the relation between capital account openness and trade 
misinvoicing. Since trade misinvoicing is motivated by the desire to 
avoid capital controls, the incentive for trade misinvoicing is expected to 
decrease with an open capital account (Patnaik et al.,2009). Another 
important policy change since 1990 has been the Customs Union 
agreement with the European Union, which came into effect in 1996. 
This agreement strengthened the trade relations with the European 
Union countries and Turkey has begun to increase its trade volume 
rapidly. The trade literature emphasizes the role of high tariffs and 
custom duties for trade misinvoicing. Therefore, the reduction in custom 
duties after the adoption of Customs Union agreement is expected to 
decrease the motivation for trade misinvoicing. In addition to these 
changes in the policy framework, the changing composition of Turkey`s 
trading partners should also be taken into account. Some new countries 
such as Russia and China has emerged as new trade partners with 
increasing importance in the recent years and the pattern of 
discrepancies in trade data with these countries requires a thorough 
examination. 
 
The estimates of the size of trade misinvoicing in Turkey vis-a-vis the 
world during the period between 1970 and 2007 reveal that 25,776 US$ 
billion left Turkey through trade misinvoicing practices. We also 
examine the country specific patterns and identify China, Netherlands, 
Germany, Switzerland and Russia as the major misinvoicing partners of 
Turkey. Turkey`s exports to China is underinvoiced while its exports 
with the other partners are usually overinvoiced. The picture is 
somewhat different for imports. Turkey reports a higher import value 
than the exports reported by Switzerland and Russia. Imports are 
underinvoiced with Germany and Netherlands and the extent of 
underinvoicing has been increasing in recent years. This implies that the 
reductions in custom duties after the Custom Union agreement with EU 
countries did not help mitigate trade misinvoicing. Our findings also 
suggest that Turkish residents have been transferring capital to China, 
Switzerland and Russia through misinvoicing practices.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section, 
we explain the method for estimating trade misinvoicing. In the third 
section, we offer statistical evidence in support of trade misinvoicing in 
Turkey and discuss the main determinants of misinvocing considering 
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macroeconomic framework. This is followed by the identification of 
major misinvoicing partners of Turkey. Finally, we outline a number of 
policy implications and conclude. 
 
2. The Method for Estimating Trade Misinvoicing 
 
 We estimate trade misinvoicing by comparing country`s export and 
import data to those of its trading partners by using the method 
pioneered by Morgenstern (1963) and later developed by Bhagwati 
(1964)
2
. However, direct comparison of data between the countries 
provides inaccurate results because exports are reported on a f.o.b. (free 
on board) basis, whereas imports are reported on a c.i.f. basis (cost, 
freight, insurance). Thus, in order to measure trade more precisely, c.i.f. 
value of exports must be converted into f.o.b. value using a c.i.f/f.o.b 
ratio (C.I.F), which has been used widely in the literature as a measure 
of transportation costs. Although freight and insurance costs vary with 
the distance and the type of the product, it is common in the literature to 
assume that freight and insurance component of imports averages to 
about 10 per cent of export value (De Wulf, 1981, p.305). Therefore, 
following the general practice, the standard C.I.F.of 1.1 is used for data 
conversions in this study. 
 
To calculate trade misinvoicing, the first step is to compute export 
discrepancies with the trading partners as follows: 
 
 XDt = PXt - (Xt*CIFt) (1) 
 
Here, PX is the value of imports reported by partner countries, X is 
exports to other countries reported by Turkey, and CIF is the c.i.f/f.o.b. 
factor, which represents the cost of freight and insurance. While a 
negative sign on XD represents export overinvoicing, a positive sign on 
XD indicates the existence of export underinvoicing.  
Import discrepancies with the trading partners (DM) are subsequently  
computed using the following equation: 
 
 DMt = IMt – (PMt*CIFt) (2) 
                                               
2
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where IM is the imports reported by Turkey and PM is the exports 
reported by partner countries. A positive sign on DM indicates a net 
overinvoicing of imports, while a negative sign indicates a net 
underinvoicing. If official figures on Turkey`s imports are greater than 
the exports reported by the partner countries, then the agents engage in 
import overinvoicing.  
 
The total trade misinvoicing TTM is obtained as the sum of export and 
import discrepancies. 
 
 TTMt = XDt + DMt (3) 
 
Here, a positive value of TTM suggests a net underrecording in trade 
statistics and an outflow of capital, while a negative value means 
overreporting and an inflow of capital.  
 
By adding absolute values, the absolute trade misinvoicing can be 
calculated as follows: 
 
 |TTMt| = |XDt| + |DMt| (4) 
 
It should be noted that the discrepancy in trade data is not always 
attributable to trade misinvoicing. Incorrect identification of source or 
destination country, time lags between the arrival and departure of 
shipment, valuation of goods at different prices at the source and the 
destination country, and the differences in commodity classification can 
also lead to discrepancies (Berger and Nitsch, 2008). The differences in 
trade data can also be because of the mistakes in recordkeeping. 
Although the export data reported by Turkey and import data reported 
by partner countries are expected to be different because of the above 
mentioned reasons, we follow the standard rule in the literature and only 
consider the discrepancies above 10% as an evidence of significant trade 
misinvoicing. 
 
It should also be pointed out that combinations of incentives may 
actually be selfdisguising in the sense that, if the partners recognize their 
mutual interests in such false reporting and collude in it, the data may 
look quite consistent (Yeats, 1990, p.2). This can be seen in terms of 
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abusive transfer pricing by multinational corporations, who vary 
invoices to move profits and capital abroad (Kar and Cartwright-Smith, 
2008).  
 
3. Trade Misinvoicing vis-à-vis The World 
 
By focusing on the salient features of Turkey’s trade regime between the 
years 1970 and 2005, we attempt to explain the changes in the direction 
of trade misinvoicing. However, before explaining the trends in trade 
misinvoicing, we will briefly review the determinants of trade 
misinvoicing in the literature to identify the driving factors of 
misinvoicing practices.  
 
One of the most important causes of trade misinvoicing is high tariffs 
and custom duties, which cause agents to underinvoice imports 
(Bhagwati, 1964; Lessard and Williamson, 1987; Boyce and 
Ndikumana, 2001). Outright export embargo on some goods as well as 
export taxes and export quotas can also lead to misreporting of trade 
data (Fisman and Wei, 2007). Some authors  argue that black market 
premium for foreign exchange is an important determinant of trade 
misinvoicing as well (Pitt, 1984; Biswas and Marjit, 2007; Buehn and 
Eichler, 2009). A higher black market premium is also expected to 
increase export underinvoicing as the entrepreneur can sell the illegal 
export revenues at a higher price in domestic currency. Further, it is 
argued by Berger and Nitsch (2008) that, since the authorities can use 
information on firm`s export activities to infer on their production, some 
firms can choose to hide exports for hiding output in order to evade 
domestic taxes. In addition, Buehn and Eichler (2009) claim that a real 
depreciation increases the optimal amount of export underinvoicing. 
People can also involve in trade misinvoicing in order to prevent loss of 
wealth due to nationalization or confiscation of wealth, therefore dejure 
capital controls can also be a factor leading to an increase in trade 
misinvoicing (Patnaik et al., 2009). 
Figure 1 traces the path of Turkey’s import misinvoicing vis-à-vis the 
world calculated using the method outlined in the previous 
section.Turkey followed an import-substitution industrialization (ISI) 
strategy until 1980. The main features of the trade regime during this 
period were high tariff rates, quantitative restrictions, overvalued 
exchange rates, and rationing on foreign exchange, which resulted in a 
tremendous incentive for import underinvoicing to evade high tariff 
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rates. In 1970, Turkey was experiencing import misinvoicing worth of 
40 per cent of total imports. The extent of underinvoicing decreased 
steadily between 1970 and 1973 as crisis conditions in the economy 
countered tariff evasion motive. After this period, there was a reversal in 
the trend of import misinvoicing and imports were overinvoiced until 
1980 since the residents were trying to move capital abroad under 
deteriorating conditions in the domestic economy with the expectation 
of depreciation of domestic currency. 
 
Figure 1: Import Misinvoicing as a Percentage of Imports (1969-2005) 
Source: Authors’calculations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, various 
years.  
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Figure 2 : Export Misinvoicing as a Percentage of Exports (1969-2005) 
Source: Authors’calculations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, various 
years. 
 
In the late 1970s, after experiencing a severe balance of payments crisis, 
Turkey implemented a new stabilization program, which comprised the 
liberalization of foreign trade regime, the removal of exchange controls, 
expansion of export incentives and subsidies, reduction in custom duties, 
tariff rates, and quantitative restrictions. Therefore, Turkey began to 
witness import underinvoicing after 1980. The rate of underinvoicing 
increased after 1981 reaching its peak in 1985. In 1985, 11% of total 
imports were underinvoiced. After the announcement of the new import 
regime in 1984, import liberalization gained impetus. The import regime 
was based on the classification of commodities into three groups: 
“prohibited list”, “imports subject to permission list”, and “liberalized 
list”. With the changes announced in 1984, around 60% of 1983 imports 
were no longer subject to restrictions. The number of commodities in the 
prohibited list, which was around 500 in 1984, was reduced to almost 
zero by 1985 and the commodities in the subject to permission list were 
reduced to 22% in 1986 and 6% in 1988 (Özler and Yılmaz, 2009). 
Moreover, the tariff rates were reduced on imports of intermediate and 
capital goods (İzmen and Yılmaz, 2009). The output weighted average 
nominal tariff rate for the manufacturing industry declined to 40% in 
1990 from 76.9% in 1984 (İzmen and Yılmaz, 2009). As a result of 
trade liberalization, import underinvoicing started to decrease with the 
changes in tariff structure.  
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The most important change in the trade regime of Turkey was Customs 
Union agreement with the European Union countries, which came into 
effect in 1996. With this agreement, Turkey eliminated the tariffs on 
imports originating from the European Union countries, and based on 
the “Common External Tariff Rule”, reduced the tariffs against imports 
from the third countries. The reduction in tariff rates is expected to cause 
a decline in import underinvoicing. However, in order to compensate the 
loss in tariff revenue from implementing the customs union, the VAT 
rates were increased and VAT evasion became the main motive of 
underinvoicing (Harrison et al., 1997). Therefore, there was a slight 
decline in the magnitude of import underinvoicing after 1996. However, 
the trend has reversed after 2001 and imports were overinvoiced again 
since the residents were trying to take capital out of the country because 
of the worsening conditions in the domestic economy caused by 2001 
financial crisis.  
 
In sum, we show that import misinvoicing has followed an oscillating 
pattern. During the import substitution phase, imports were heavily 
underinvoiced because of the protectionist trade policies. Trade 
liberalization policies were useful in reducing the extent of misinvoicing 
during the 1980s at the aggregate level. Interestingly, however, import 
overinvoicing has been increasing in recent years since the residents 
have been moving capital abroad through misinvoicing practices. Thus, 
contrary to the expectations, import overinvoicing did not disappear 
with capital account liberalization policies. 
 
Figure 2 shows that, due to high subsidies and export promotion 
schemes, Turkey has consistently experienced export overinvoicing 
between 1970 and 2005 with few exceptions. In late 1970s, exports were 
overinvoiced due to the high black market premium. However, export 
overinvoicing was greater between 1981 and 1988, which was 
characterized by export-led growth strategies. In order to encourage 
exports, corporate tax allowances, tax exemptions on imported goods 
and preferential and subsidized export credits were provided. Moreover, 
direct payments were made to the exporters through tax rebates and cash 
premia from extra budgetary funds. During this period, the total subsidy 
rate received by the exporters of manufactured goods reached 23% of 
export value (Milanovic, 1986). These generous export subsidies given 
during this period encouraged overinvoicing of exports and even 
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resulted in the so-called “phantom export” transactions that are designed 
to illegally take advantage of the generous export subsidies. Export 
overinvoicing reached its peak in 1984 but started to decrease after that 
year as reductions in tax rebates took place in the following years 
because the European Parliament accused Turkey of unfair competition 
because of its export promotion incentives (Müftüler, 1995). In 1989, all 
monetary incentives to exports had been lifted but the government 
adopted new measures to encourage exports such as performance and 
pre-shipment credits, fund refunds, corporate income tax exclusion and 
premium payments. After the reductions in monetary export subsidies, 
exporters overinvoiced the value of exports in 1991 and 1992. During 
these years, currency was perceived as overvalued and the exporters 
tended to overinvoice to realize a greater amount of domestic currency 
for a given amount of foreign exchange receipts in case of a 
depreciation. After 1993, the extent of overinvoicing in Turkey has 
steadily increased reaching its peak in 1997. However, it has shown a 
decline over the five years that followed.  
 
Some of the earlier studies on trade misinvoicing mention export 
promotion instruments and the availability of low interest credits as the 
main factor of export overinvoicing (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989; Gunluk-
Senesen, 1997). However, in recent years we see also the emergence of 
other elements affecting the direction of trade misinvoicing. One such 
factor is the establishment and rising importance of free trade zones. A 
free trade zone (FTZ) is an area of a country where some trade barriers 
such as tariffs and quantity restrictions are eliminated in order to attract 
foreign investments. In Turkey, the idea of establishing free trade zones 
go back to as early as 1927, but the most important developments took 
place in 1985, when “Free Trade Zones Law” was issued “to increase 
exports, reduce unemployment, accelerate the inflow of foreign capital, 
and to increase the utilization of external finance” (Kibritcioglu, 1996). 
Free trade zones provide many opportunities for exporters such as less 
bureaucracy, lower tax burden, and better job environment. Production 
companies in an FZT are exempt from corporate and income taxes. 
Goods imported from abroad are exempt from customs duty and goods 
purchased in Turkey by companies located in an FTZ are exempt from 
VAT as well. Because of these advantages of FTZs, the number of FTZs 
has been increasing rapidly since 1987. It is estimated that in 2007, the 
volume of trade in FTZs was 24 billion US$, which constituted 8% of 
total trade volume (Kocaman, 2007). While free trade zones provide 
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many benefits to the host country and the exporters, they also encourage 
export overinvoicing and fictitious exports. Although an FTZ is within 
the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey, it is treated as if it were a 
territory abroad, thus the products sent to free trade zones are considered 
as exports. Furthermore, the units in FTZs may divert duty-free raw 
materials in the domestic area and overinvoice exports to fulfill export 
obligations. Indeed, there is a growing literature on the relation between 
free trade zones and increasing corruption in foreign trade transactions. 
Free trade zones which are associated with trade liberalization policies 
may increase false reporting of trade values. Pitt (1981) argues that the 
greater the legal trade, the easier it is to hide smuggling from 
enforcement activities, and one way the import underinvoicing can be 
realized is through free trade zones. Another criticism against FTZs is 
that, while free trade zones is a way of attracting multinational 
companies increasing job opportunities and investment, they also lead to 
an increase in transfer pricing practices. Transfer pricing refers to 
misinvoicing engaged in by related parties in different countries such as 
different branches of a multinational corporation (Wang, 2007). With 
this practice, these companies can shift profits out of the host country to 
low tax countries and avoid higher tariffs. Overall, we suggest that one 
reason for the growing export overinvoicing in Turkey in recent years is 
the illegal activities in free trade zones and transfer pricing practices of 
multinational companies. 
 
4. Major Trade Misinvoicing Partners of Turkey 
 
Estimating trade misinvoicing at the aggregate level gives us some idea 
about the direction of misinvoicing but it does not tell about the whole 
picture. Distinguishing major misinvoicing partners of Turkey and 
examining country-specific patterns can help us analyze the changes in 
the direction of trade misinvoicing in detail. The previous studies on 
trade misinvoicing in Turkey focused on the bilateral data discrapencies 
with the European Union countries since these countries have always 
been the major trading partners of Turkey. However, there have been 
some changes in the composition of trade partners in recent years and 
this fact should also be taken into consideration when examining trade 
misinvoicing
3
. Today, with the Customs Union agreement, Turkey 
                                               
3 The changing composition of Turkey’s trade partners is shown on Table 1 on the Appendix. 
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strengthened the trade relations with the EU countries. While trade with 
the EU-27 accounted for 55 per cent of Turkey`s exports in 1996, this 
share steadily increased to 58 % in 2004. In recent years, however, the 
share of the EU countries in total trade has declined as the trade with 
some other countries increased. Among the countries as newly emerging 
trade partners, China attracts the most attention. China’s accession to the 
WTO in 2001 led to an important change in the structure of Turkey’s 
imports. The share of imports from China continuously increased after 
2001. While the share of imports from China was around 2% in 1996, 
this share jumped to 7.5 % in 2007. China is now one of the most 
important  trade partners. The share of Pan-European partners in Turkish 
trade has also increased from 4% in 1985 to 9 % in 2003 and and 11% in 
2008.  The expansion in exports to Romania and Bulgaria are especially 
notable (Kaminsky and Ng, 2007). Turkey has also increased its trade 
with Russia in recent years with Turkey’s increased exporting of 
construction services and importing of natural gas in return. As a result, 
the Russian Federation has emerged as the fifth major market for 
Turkish exports in the second half of the 1990s, and the share of exports 
from Russia reached its peak in 1997.  
 
In order to identify major trade misinvoicing partners, we calculate net 
and absolute trade misinvoicing for the 10 countries
4
 with which 
Turkey`s trade volume is the largest.  The bulk of the total trade takes 
place with these 10 countires, comprising about 60 percent of total trade 
volume
5
. The results are presented in Table 1. Between 1990 and 2007, 
Turkey`net unrecorded trade amounts to US$ 25,776 billion, while the 
amount of absolute unrecorded trade is US$ 145,735 billion between 
1990 and 2007. Based on the results in Table 1, Turkey`s major trade 
misinvoicing partners are identified as Germany, China, Russia, 
Netherlands and Switzerland. The other trade partners have relatively 
little trade misinvoicing. Turkey has usually understated its bilateral 
trade with Switzerland, China and Russia, while it has overstated its 
trade with Netherlands. 
 
                                               
4 These countries are France, Germany, Italy, UK, Russia, Spain, China, USA, Switzerland and 
Netherlands. 
5 Details of the calculations are available in the Appendix. Although United Arab Emirates and 
Iraq have also become important trade partners of Turkey in recent years, we did not include 
these countries because of data limitations. 
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Table 1 : Trade Misinvoicing with Partners, US$ Billion, 1990-2007 
 
 
Turkey’s trade partner Net Absolute 
China 9,40 9,69 
France 1,23 4,52 
Germany -24,45 32,85 
Italy -8,61 10,24 
Neth. -14,43 15,36 
Russia 4,22 26,24 
Spain 0,30 4,41 
Switz. 9,80 14,23 
UK -0,01 9,63 
USA 0,92 11,99 
 
Source: Authors’calculations based on UNCOMTRADE database. 
Note: Figures are sums for 1990-2007. A positive sign indicates a capital outflow and a negative 
sign indicates a capital inflow. 
 
Next, we turn to examine the direction of export and import 
misinvoicing between Turkey and the countries identifed above in order 
to find out if  certain trade partners  indicate exceptional patterns in trade 
misinvoicing contrary to the usual trend at the aggregate level, which is 
export overinvoicing and import underinvoicing in most of the cases. 
Table  presents the percentage of export misinvoicing in total exports 
for major trade partners. It can be seen from the table that the export-
import data discrepancy between Turkey and USA, UK, France, 
Germany and Italy is lower than 10 % in most of the years except a few 
exceptions. The country specific patterns indicate the existence of export 
overinvoicing as was the case in aggregate data except for the case of 
China. Following the 10% rule, we can conclude that export 
misinvoicing is greatest with Russia, Netherlands and Switzerland. 
Turkey overstated its exports with these countries throughout the whole 
period. While the percentage of overinvoiced exports with Russia has 
decreased over time, it has shown an increasing trend for the case of 
Switzerland and Netherlands although there have been some 
oscillations. The pattern for Switzerland and Netherlands imply that the 
expectation of a decrease in discrepancies in the liberal period did not 
take place. This result is similar to the one obtained by Tokdemir and 
Gunluk-Senesen (1997). The existence of discrepancies can be 
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explained by the commodity type. Export overinvoicing with 
Switzerland was especially high for the commodities classified under 
BEC 2 (industrial supplies) and BEC 7 (goods not classified 
elsewhere)
6
. Re-exports of goods from Switzerland, such as processed 
inputs for textiles, can be another contributing factor to overinvoicing 
(Tokdemir, 1987).  
 
An interesting pattern can be observed in trade with China where, as 
opposed to the general trend, exports were usually underinvoiced. One 
explanation for this is the treatment of China`s entrepot trade through 
Hong Kong differently by two countries. Indeed, China`s entrepot trade 
has been cited as one of the most important reasons of the large trade 
data discrepancies between China and its partner countries. China`s 
trading partner countries including Turkey consider the value of goods 
to Hong Kong as exports to China without making any adjustments to 
the data. Moreover, Turkish statistics do not make any reconciliations 
for the mark-ups charged by unrelated party Hong Kong middleman for 
their re-export activities. As a result, exports to China are usually 
understated. However, due to the accession of China to World Trade 
Organization, the discrepancies seem to normalize after 2001. 
 
Table 3 presents the trends in import misinvoicing. The general 
tendency has been import underinvoicing for most of the countries, 
although there are some exceptional destinations as well and China is 
one of these countries. Imports from China were overinvoiced 
throughout the whole period, which suggests the possibility of 
overinvoicing of Turkish imports from China or under-invoicing of 
Chinese exports to Turkey. It can be argued that there is not much 
incentive for Turkish importers to overinvoice imports to China since 
this will increase the custom duties they need to pay. On the other hand, 
Chinese exporters may have the motivation to underinvoice exports to 
avoid Chinese taxation and the restrictions on capital outflows. This 
practice is called “roundtripping,” which is a trade-tax investment 
                                               
6 Trade misinvoicing is calculated for Broad Economic Categories as well in order to give 
information about the foreign trade regime specific to each commodity. Trade Misinvoicing 
estimates calculated according to BECs are given in the Appendix. The BEC categories are 
BEC-1 food and beverages, BEC-2 industrial supplies, BEC 3 fuels and lubricants, BEC 4 
capital goods, parts and accessories except for transport equipment, BEC 5 transport equipment, 
parts and accessories, BEC 6 consumption goods not elsewhere classified, and BEC 7 goods not 
elsewhere classified. 
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strategy to move capital out of China through misinvoicing. This 
domestic capital abroad then returns to the country in the form of 
foreign direct investment. The roundtripping activities in China have 
been one of the main causes of the trade data discrepancies in the recent 
years. 
Table 2 : Percentage of Export Misinvoicing in Total Exports, 1990-2007 
 
 China France Germany Italy Neth. Russia Spain Switz. UK USA 
1990 30 10 3 7 -21 - 14 -52 21 9 
1991 130 14 4 -3 -23 - 25 -46 -4 8 
1992 -36 6 10 -7 -9 -23 30 -38 -9 27 
1993 -13 -4 0 -4 -14 21 17 -43 -18 20 
1994 21 0 4 -1 -13 -61 7 -32 -3 1 
1995 105 1 0 -4 -10 -66 1 -20 -1 17 
1996 35 4 -1 -1 -7 -71 13 -29 5 6 
1997 35 2 -2 -1 -5 -71 16 -41 3 1 
1998 2 13 1 -1 2 -71 6 -16 1 10 
1999 19 12 -1 4 0 -57 3 -17 2 3 
2000 29 11 0 6 -1 -55 13 -8 0 -5 
2001 6 7 -1 6 -3 -54 -1 -3 6 -6 
2002 6 10 2 7 -5 -48 10 -7 5 4 
2003 -4 2 -1 8 -13 -42 3 -18 59 -2 
2004 41 1 3 -4 -28 -44 7 -14 -1 0 
2005 3 5 0 -24 -26 -38 9 -21 -3 4 
2006 1 5 9 -9 -24 -28 10 -51 -2 4 
2007 14 0 0 -12 -32 -22 16 -34 -4 7 
 
Source: Authors’calculations based on UNCOMTRADE database. 
Note: Positive numbers mean export underinvoicing, while negative numbers mean 
overinvoicing. 
 
Another exceptional trade partner is Switzerland. The reported import 
data by Turkey is in general higher than the reported export data by 
Switzerland. This can be attributed to capital flight from Turkey, as 
residents report higher import values in order to move capital to 
Switzerland, which has always been a destination for transfer of capital 
thanks to its special banking conditions. We would expect that 
overinvoicing of imports, which is a vehicle for the transfer of capital 
abroad, decrease with the liberalization of capital account. However, far 
from decreasing, import overinvoicing has been increasing in recent 
16 
 
years suggesting that capital account liberalization did not help mitigate 
import overinvoicing.  
 
Imports with Germany, Netherlands and the United States in some years 
are underinvoiced. The pattern for Netherlands is rather interesting. 
Imports have been consistently underinvoiced and the percentage of 
underinvoiced imports has been increasing over time reaching %115 in 
2007. This increase of the percentage of underinvoiced imports is 
mainly based on the commodities classified as BEC-5 (transport 
equipment, parts and accessories) and BEC-6 (consumption goods not 
elsewhere classified categories)
7
. These large figures of import 
underinvoicing indicate that the expectation of a decrease in trade 
misinvoicing after the adoption of customs union agreement did not 
realize in Turkey. 
 
Table 3: Percentage of Import Misinvoicing in Total Imports, 1990-2007 
 
 China France Germany Italy Neth. Russia Spain Switz. UK USA 
1990 78 -5 -27 -8 -15 - 2 -20 -18 -9 
1991 65 -3 -46 -5 -14 - 11 -8 -23 -20 
1992 56 -11 -24 -15 12 31 -12 26 -12 -15 
1993 29 -7 -23 -14 -3 23 -20 1 7 -13 
1994 21 -4 58 -5 4 0 -11 5 -3 -25 
1995 12 -1 -26 -11 -1 14 -14 -8 4 19 
1996 19 -5 -10 -11 12 2 -3 10 -89 3 
1997 22 -6 -5 -8 -11 0 -7 0 -15 10 
1998 14 -3 -10 -6 9 1 -8 0 0 3 
1999 22 -7 -8 -2 2 24 -16 -4 5 -14 
2000 10 -4 -17 -6 -26 12 -29 -5 -10 -6 
2001 20 6 -7 -8 -32 -4 -3 36 7 -5 
2002 12 4 -9 0 -29 4 -9 44 13 -11 
2003 13 5 -17 -5 -48 3 -9 53 18 9 
2004 31 8 -29 -11 -75 9 -9 48 -6 22 
2005 32 -7 -28 -9 -94 8 -4 55 5 13 
2006 17 2 -28 -6 -112 12 3 49 2 -30 
2007 13 0 -27 -7 -115 37 -2 54 5 11 
 
Source: Authors’calculations based on UNCOMTRADE database. 
Note: Positive numbers mean import overinvoicing, while negative numbers mean import 
underinvoicing. 
 
                                               
7 See Appendix for calculations of trade misinvoicing for Broad Economic Categories (BEC). 
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5. Conclusion and Policy Implications  
 
Utilizing bilateral partner country statistics, we estimate the size of trade 
misinvoicing in Turkey between 1970 and 2007. We find that 
overinvoicing is the main export misinvoicing trend. Import 
misinvoicing, however, exhibit an oscillating pattern. The reversals in 
the direction of import misinvoicing are mainly related to the changing 
conditions in the macroeconomic environment and capital flight motives 
as well as the liberalization of current and capital account.  
 
We also estimate trade misinvoicing between Turkey and its major trade 
partners and find that Turkey`s net unrecorded trade amounts to US$ 
8.91billion, while the amount of absolute unrecorded trade is US$ 
145,735 billion between 1990 and 2007, meaning that US$ 8,91 billion 
left the country through trade misinvoicing. We examine country 
specific trends in the direction of trade misinvoicing as well and identify 
China, Germany, Russia, Switzerland, and Netherlands as the main 
misinvoicing partners. At the country-level analysis, export 
overinvoicing is still the main tendency except the case of China. On the 
import side, China and Switzerland emerge as the exceptional trade 
partners. Trade misinvoicing with the EU countries has been increasing 
in recent years meaning that the Customs Union agreement did not help 
trade misinvocing  diminish. 
 
The large and persistent discrepancies in foreign trade data have 
important policy implications. First of all, trade misinvoicing may 
facilitate capital flight because the agents can move capital abroad by 
misreporting their trade transactions.
8
 In this sense, trade misinvoicing 
represents “lost resources” since these resources leave the country 
without the control of the domestic authorities leading to a decrease in 
the funds necessary for growth and development. Trade misinvoicing 
has also adverse affects on the wealth distribution of the society as some 
citizens evade higher taxation by transferring funds abroad. This 
eventually erodes the domestic tax base and reduces government 
revenue (Farzanegan, 2009). Thus, an important policy challenge for 
                                               
8  For further discussion of trade misinvoicing as a channel of capital flight, the reader is 
referred to Claessens and Naude (1993), Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) and Patnaik (2008). 
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Turkey is to prevent capital from fleeing abroad through trade 
misinvoicing and implement policies to facilitate capital repatriation so 
that these resources can be utilized to increase domestic investment. 
When considering the mechanisms to prevent capital flight, we should 
question the role of capital account liberalization. After capital account 
liberalization, we expect to experience a fall in trade misinvoicing since 
the agents can transfer capital in legal ways (Patnaik et al., 2009). 
However, this expectation did not realize for Turkey. 
 
Misreported trade data can cause policy prescriptions based on these 
statistics to be misleading. Baldwin (2006) for example, stated that the 
effect of VAT fraud was so large that the United Kingdom had to restate 
its national accounts. Biswas and Marjit (2005) consider the 
consequences of the devaluations in India on exports and imports and 
conclude that the impact of a devaluation on exports and imports will be 
overestimated in the existence of large amounts of trade misinvoicing. 
Furthermore, errors in developing country trade data could affect 
government policies relating to investment, balance of payments, 
initiatives for the liberalization of trade barriers and exchange rate 
policy (Yeats, 1990). In order to decrease trade misinvoicing, one 
measure is to eliminate all the incentives that lead agents to misinvoice. 
The implementation of regulatory mechanisms can also prevent 
misreporting of trade data. Finally, sound trade management policies 
and tough penalties can be used (Beja, 2008). In this respect, a close 
collaboration between Turkey and its trading partners is required.  
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 : Export Shares of Major Trade Partners of Turkey (1990-2007) 
 
 China France Germany Italy Neth. Russia Spain Switz. UK USA Total 
1990 0,29 5,69 23,81 8,54 3,36 - 1,54 2,26 5,75 7,47 58,68 
1991 0,15 5,07 25,11 7,15 3,49 - 1,75 1,81 4,97 6,72 56,22 
1992 1 5,5 24,88 6,41 3,4 3 2,03 1,51 5,41 5,88 59,01 
1993 3,34 5,02 23,81 4,89 4,05 3,29 1,3 1,41 5,44 6,43 58,96 
1994 1,96 4,7 21,73 5,71 3,43 4,53 1,29 1,32 4,91 8,4 57,98 
1995 0,31 4,78 23,3 6,74 3,41 5,7 1,67 1,1 5,25 7 59,27 
1996 0,28 4,52 22,35 6,24 3,32 6,48 1,59 1,19 5,41 7,01 58,4 
1997 0,17 4,43 20,02 5,29 2,97 7,84 1,67 1,21 5,76 7,72 57,08 
1998 0,14 4,84 20,27 5,79 3,29 5,01 1,92 0,91 6,36 8,29 56,83 
1999 0,14 5,92 20,59 6,33 3,51 2,21 2,87 1,01 6,88 9,17 58,62 
2000 0,33 6,01 18,81 6,39 3,17 2,33 2,56 0,87 7,36 11,18 59,01 
2001 0,64 6,05 17,13 7,47 2,85 2,95 3,03 0,77 6,94 9,98 57,81 
2002 0,7 5,94 16,32 6,6 2,92 3,27 3,12 0,81 8,41 9,26 57,33 
2003 1,07 5,98 15,84 6,76 3,23 2,89 3,79 0,76 7,77 7,94 56,03 
2004 0,62 5,81 13,85 7,35 3,39 2,95 4,15 0,7 8,78 7,68 55,29 
2005 0,75 5,18 12,87 8,58 3,36 3,24 4,1 0,76 8,05 6,68 53,56 
2006 0,81 5,38 11,32 7,89 2,97 3,79 4,35 1,06 7,97 5,92 51,46 
2007 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 
 
Source: Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade of Turkey, 2008 
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Table 2 : Import Shares of Major Trade Partners of Turkey (1990-2007) 
 
 China France Germany Italy Neth. Russia Spain Switz. UK USA Total 
1990 1,1 6,01 15,81 7,74 2,57 - 1,55 2,41 4,55 10,23 52,0 
1991 0,82 5,83 15,36 8,77 3,05 - 1,53 2,32 5,54 10,72 53,9 
1992 0,75 5,91 16,42 8,39 3,05 4,55 1,4 3,01 5,19 11,37 60,0 
1993 0,87 6,64 15,4 8,69 2,96 5,24 1,46 2,21 5,25 11,39 60,1 
1994 1,11 6,27 15,67 8,63 3,18 4,49 1,63 2,03 5,03 10,44 58,5 
1995 1,51 5,59 15,54 8,94 3,04 5,83 1,66 2,29 5,12 10,43 60,0 
1996 1,28 6,24 17,66 9,89 3,3 4,43 2,3 2,62 0,57 7,66 56,0 
1997 1,62 6,1 16,51 9,19 3,06 4,48 2,63 2,27 5,68 8,91 60,4 
1998 1,84 6,61 15,92 9,22 3,15 4,69 2,78 2,21 5,84 8,81 61,1 
1999 2,2 7,69 14,45 7,85 3,23 5,84 3,1 1,84 5,38 7,57 59,1 
2000 2,44 6,49 13,23 7,98 2,91 7,18 3,08 1,64 4,99 7,18 57,1 
2001 2,24 5,52 12,89 8,42 2,52 8,3 2,58 2,96 4,62 7,88 57,9 
2002 2,66 5,94 13,68 8,06 2,55 7,53 2,71 4,17 4,74 5,98 58,0 
2003 3,76 6,01 13,63 7,89 2,39 7,86 2,89 4,28 5,05 5,04 58,8 
2004 4,59 6,36 12,83 7,04 1,96 9,26 3,34 3,49 4,43 4,86 58,2 
2005 5,9 5,04 11,68 6,48 1,84 11,05 3,04 3,47 4,02 4,6 57,1 
2006 6,93 5,19 10,58 6,21 1,55 12,76 2,75 2,88 3,68 4,49 57,0 
2007 7,78 4,62 10,31 5,86 1,56 13,82 2,55 3,1 3,22 4,8 57,6 
 
Source: Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade of Turkey, 2008 
24 
 
 
Table 3 : Export Misinvoicing with Selected Countries, US$ Millions 
 
Turkey 
with… 
China France Germany Italy Neth. Russia Spain Switz. UK USA 
1990 11,1 72,54 81,5 81,12 -89,87 - 27,51 -151,62 159,76 90,65 
1991 26,53 93,49 132,32 -24,72 -111,33 - 59,68 -113,69 -29,63 70,34 
1992 -52,84 49,25 360,13 -66,97 -46,8 -103,02 88,47 -85,27 -72,92 231,91 
1993 -65,57 -30,39 5,88 -31,34 -84,45 105,19 33,74 -91,99 -151,46 194,89 
1994 73,51 -0,21 150,98 -14,55 -81,61 -502,21 15,2 -76,17 -29,52 20,19 
1995 70,23 11,82 21,45 -61,99 -70,46 -813,25 2,91 -47,55 -15,1 261,81 
1996 22,52 41,21 -49,18 -8,22 -52,67 -1055,4 46,01 -79,88 62,5 104,57 
1997 15,71 22,25 -93,42 -17,75 -41,12 -1467,6 72,02 -129,68 46,95 14,92 
1998 0,93 166,29 72,95 -16,45 15,95 -963 33,08 -38,56 21,59 225,96 
1999 7 184,98 -34,92 62,26 -2,6 -334,91 22,83 -46,62 37,25 80,82 
2000 26,28 182,27 -1,61 102,44 -5,93 -353,59 90,67 -19,9 5,03 -143,3 
2001 11,63 133,69 -80,08 132,01 -24,32 -495,57 -12,99 -6,62 131,48 -183,6 
2002 13,91 214,87 99,26 174,47 -50,71 -556,58 107,22 -18,86 157,74 118,65 
2003 -22,42 67,42 -89,58 252,93 -205,87 -578,19 57,99 -63,92 2176,08 -67,16 
2004 160,64 33,85 251,62 -172,13 -588,35 -817,42 175,38 -60,83 -69,69 -11,69 
2005 17 208,39 34,02 -1502,7 -637,48 -893,58 272,75 -118,38 -173,99 182,6 
2006 3,61 227,67 847,42 -636,77 -602,28 -906,78 362,29 -458,02 -142,36 206,89 
2007 148,8 -2,11 21,84 -902,81 -962,97 -1027,6 743,63 -318,85 -352,85 301,7 
 
Source: Authors’calculations based on UNCOMTRADE database. 
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Table 4 : Import Misinvoicing with Selected Countries, US$ Millions 
 
Turkey 
with… 
China France Germany Italy Neth. Russia Spain Switz. UK USA 
1990 192,41 -70,2 -954,2 -129,74 -87,09 - 6,62 -107,96 -179,5 -196,73 
1991 111,31 -35,05 -1475,7 -99,45 -92,08 - 36,02 -39,28 -268,4 -458,93 
1992 96,55 -146,99 -898,67 -281,46 87,25 326,91 -37,39 179,15 -145,1 -402,29 
1993 72,95 -130,43 -1061,8 -353,43 -29,94 356,52 -84,93 8,17 112,97 -426,31 
1994 54,86 -63,64 2123,9 -94,24 31,19 1 -40,49 25,43 -37,45 -599,53 
1995 65,25 -22,09 -1447,5 -362,89 -5,58 287,17 -85,43 -67,43 65,44 724,01 
1996 104,02 -129,22 -748,3 -467,5 175,59 45,65 -28,91 107,03 -2192,1 112,86 
1997 174,98 -183,38 -401,52 -369,59 -169,89 -7,41 -94,3 -2,46 -425,86 436,26 
1998 121,09 -101,65 -766,89 -267,13 128,25 24,56 -108,28 3,55 -5,1 130,88 
1999 194,55 -216,61 -478,76 -50,38 22,7 580,22 -199,17 -28,71 105,04 -436,68 
2000 135,94 -125,22 -1239,2 -273,03 -409,17 478,85 -490,41 -42,33 -268,7 -217,13 
2001 184,21 148,16 -363,47 -279,87 -329,41 -135,26 -28,54 442,35 124,66 -156,06 
2002 167,99 111 -617,6 12 -382,41 168,97 -121,84 951,28 313,98 -349,4 
2003 338,64 207,84 -1591,7 -274,48 -803,24 163,11 -185,01 1585,7 631,71 302,38 
2004 1372,66 525,03 -3645,1 -749,61 -1439,3 848,88 -302,39 1637,99 -260,59 1048,06 
2005 2206,3 -389,27 -3842,7 -680,66 -2028,6 980,03 -132,35 2242,09 249,19 674,18 
2006 1635,5 163,94 -4093,2 -497,19 -2414,9 2087,24 102,95 1982,91 115,22 -1885,5 
2007 1710,9 11,2 -4676,7 -739,91 -3044 8776,59 -102,79 2850,39 292,76 922,57 
 
Source: Authors’calculations based on UNCOMTRADE database. 
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Table 5: Trade Misinvoicing, According to Broad Economic Categories, 1998-2007, US$ 
 
XD=PX–(X*CIF) BEC1 BEC2 BEC3 BEC4 BEC5 BEC6 BEC7 Total 
Germany -0,025 -1,507 -0,033 -8,068 -6,383 -1,761 -3,537 -21,315 
Russia 0,318 5,045 18,868 -0,543 -0,310 -0,067 22,600 45,910 
China -0,078 1,849 -0,126 5,941 -0,214 0,799 -0,103 8,068 
Switzerland 0,006 13,597 -0,027 -0,032 -0,171 -1,753 0,005 11,625 
Netherland -0,145 -0,833 0,101 -5,209 -1,864 5,897 -0,251 -2,304 
Total 0,077 18,151 18,783 -7,911 -8,943 3,115 18,713 41,984 
 
DM=IM-(PM*CIF) BEC1 BEC2 BEC3 BEC4 BEC5 BEC6 BEC7 Total 
Germany 1,210 0,080 -0,074 1,178 -1,876 0,432 0,170 1,121 
Russia -0,927 -2,809 -0,071 -0,598 -0,014 -2,497 -0,011 -6,927 
China -0,035 0,943 0,016 0,045 -0,087 0,074 -0,589 0,367 
Switzerland -0,001 -1,129 -0,105 0,005 0,072 0,010 -0,003 -1,151 
Netherland -0,903 -1,500 -0,419 0,179 -9,030 -11,341 0,051 -22,962 
Total -0,655 -4,414 -0,652 0,809 -10,935 -13,321 -0,382 -29,551 
 
TTM=XD+DM  BEC1 BEC2 BEC3 BEC4 BEC5 BEC6 BEC7 Total 
Germany 1,185 -1,427 -0,107 -6,890 -8,259 -1,329 -3,368 -20,194 
Russia -0,609 2,236 18,797 -1,142 -0,324 -2,565 22,589 38,983 
China -0,112 2,792 -0,111 5,985 -0,301 0,873 -0,692 8,435 
Switzerland 0,005 12,468 -0,132 -0,026 -0,099 -1,743 0,002 10,475 
Netherland -1,047 -2,333 -0,318 -5,030 -10,895 -5,443 -0,201 -25,266 
Total -0,578 13,736 18,130 -7,102 -19,878 -10,207 18,331 12,433 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCOMTRADE database. 
Note: Figures are sums for 1998-2007. 
